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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-Placement of
Children in Religiously Affiliated Foster Care Facilities Held
Not Violative of Establishment Clause Where State Acts in loco
parentis to Meet Free Exercise Rights of Children in Its Care.
Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (per cur-
Jam).
The New York State Constitution provides for the assignment of
foster children to "an institution or agency governed by persons, or
in the custody of a person, of the same religious persuasion as the
child." (matching)I It likewise empowers the state to reimburse fos-
ter care institutions for the expense of caring for the children (fund-
ing).'
Plaintiffs, six children for whom guardians were appointed,
sought a declaratory judgment that provisions of the New York
State Constitution and statutes implementing these constitutional
provisions violate the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments of
1. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32. This intention is implemented by provi-
sions of the New York Social Services Law which provide in part: "1.
Whenever a child is committed to any agency ... such commitment shall
be made, when practicable, to an authorized agency under the control of
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child." N.Y. Soc. WELFARE
LAW § 373 (McKinney 1966), as amended and retitled, N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 373 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The Family Court Act specifies that
such religious matching "shall, so far as consistent with the best interests
of the child, and where practicable, be applied so as to give effect to the
religious wishes of the natural mother, if the child is born out-of-wedlock,
or if born in-wedlock, the religious wishes of the parents of the child ..
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 116(g) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(2) permits the state legislature to provide
for "the aid, care and support of neglected and dependent children ...
through agencies and institutions authorized by the state board of social
welfare or other state department having the power of inspection thereof,
by payments made on a per capita basis directly or through the subdivi-
sions of the state . . . ." See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 153(a)-(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1974), which provides the statutory scheme for the funding of
these social welfare programs. It should be noted that the method by which
private foster care facilities receive funds from the state does not involve
"direct" subsidies, but reimbursement on a contractual basis. These ar-
rangements involve the foster care facilities and local social service dis-
tricts. The state, in turn, is authorized to reimburse the local districts for
their expenses. Id.
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the United States Constitution.3 Defendants were public agencies
and officials responsible for the administration of the child care
system.'
A special three-judge federal court5 concluded that the New York
program did not, on its face, violate the United States Constitution.6
Pursuant to a pre-trial order the issue before the court was defined
as: "'[w]hether New York Social Services Law § 373(1), (2) and
(5), New York State Constitution Article 6, § 32, Family Court Act
§ 116(a), New York Social Services Law § 153 and New York Con-
stitution Article 7, § 8(2) violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States on their
face . . . .' " The court recognized that "the issues now before [it]
present a clash between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment"' and "ascertainment of the proper
3. The decision reached in this opinion relates only to the facial consti-
tutionality of the New York child care program. Accordingly only the ques-
tion of whether the funding and matching aspects of the New York pro-
gram violate the first amendment is discussed in this Note. Further pro-
ceedings in this case are discussed in N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, at 1, col.
6.
4. Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (per cur-
iam). Those named as defendants included the heads of the New York City
Human Resources Administration, Special Services for Children, Bureau
of Child Welfare, the Administrative Judge of the Family Court, the Com-
mission of the N.Y. State Department of Social Services, and the Execu-
tive Director of the N.Y. State Board of Social Welfare, as well as the
administrators and directors of the seventy-seven agencies which provide
for child care in the City of New York. The religious aspect of the issue is
reflected by the amici curiae briefs filed on behalf of the Federation of
Jewish Philanthropies of New York, the Federation of Protestant Welfare
Agencies, Inc., the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, and Catholic
Charities, Diocese of Brooklyn. Id. at 1015-17.
5. The court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2283 (1970).
6. 385 F. Supp. at 1029.
7. Id. at 1018.
8. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ." This prohibition is made applicable to the states
via the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
[fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
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'wall' between Church and State . . .in a given context is, as al-
ways, fraught with difficulties."' Balancing these competing claims
of the first amendment, the court concluded that when the state
acts in loco parentis it assumes the obligation of providing for the
total well-being of children entrusted to its care, and may constitu-
tionally provide funds to foster care facilities run by religious organi-
zations which meet a child's religious needs.'"
In Dickens v. Ernesto," the New York Court of Appeals passed
upon the constitutionality of the same religious matching provisions
as were before the court in Wilder. Plaintiffs in Dickens had filed
an application to become adoptive parents. The application was
denied on the grounds that the adoptive parents did not have a
religious affiliation." The court held that the denial of plaintiffs'
application did not infringe their constitutional rights. It reasoned
that under the New York Constitution:
religion is but one of many factors in the placement of a child for adoption
and . ..that placement in conformity with "the religious wishes of the
parents of the child," though desirable, is not mandatory. . . .Thus, the
challenged legislation places primary emphasis on the temporal best in-
terests of the child, although the religious preference of the natural parents
remains a relevant consideration. 3
Amendment." Id. at 303. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
9. 385 F. Supp. at 1019. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (compulsory education unconstitutional); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (federal funds used for building on sectarian college cam-
pus constitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemp-
tions for church property constitutional); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer recitation in public schools
unconstitutional); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (New York's
"released time" program constitutional).
10. 385 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
11. 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 407 U.S. 917 (1972); see Annot.,
48 A.L.R.3d 383, 410-13 (1973).
12. 30 N.Y.2d at 64, 281 N.E.2d at 154, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 347; see 1
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 106 (1972).
13. 30 N.Y.2d at 65-66, 281 N.E.2d at 155, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 348. Contra,
In re Adoption of "E," 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971) (adoption cannot
be denied solely on grounds of prospective parents' lack of religious
beliefs). See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 366 (1973). The court found that
19751
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The decision in Dickens was preceded by a line of state decisions
which were not always consistent in their interpretation of the
matching policy. In In re Adoption of Maxwell, 14 the court of appeals
took an even less rigid approach to the matching question than it
did in Dickens, approving an adoption in the best interests of the
child, despite religious difference between the child and the adop-
tive parents. 5 However, in Starr v. De Rocco,"6 the court departed
from Maxwell and held that, absent compelling circumstances to
the contrary, custody should be awarded to persons of the same
religious persuasion as that of the child. 7
nothing in the statutes violated other considerations relevant to the first
amendment: "[The relevant legislation] undoubtedly fulfills a 'secular
legislative purpose' and certainly reflects and preserves a 'benevolent neu-
trality' toward religion. And, just as clearly, the 'matching' provisions
neither have the 'primary effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion [sic]
nor foster an 'excessive government entanglement' with church interests."
30 N.Y.2d at 66, 281 N.E.2d at 156, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (citations
omitted). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). See also
10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 124 (1958).
15. Accord, In re Adoption of Michael D., 37 App. Div. 2d 78, 322
N.Y.S.2d 532 (4th Dep't 1971); In re Efrain C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314
N.Y.S.2d 255 (Family Ct. 1970); In re Anonymous, 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261
N.Y.S.2d 439 (Family Ct. 1965). But see In re Adoption of "William G.
Hale," 207 Misc. 240, 137 N.Y.S.2d 720 (County Ct. 1955) where a petition
for adoption was denied under almost exactly similar circumstances.
16. 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969) (mem.).
17. Id. at 1012, 250 N.E.2d at 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 836. This strict
approach to religious matching was also applied in the much criticized
cases of In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951)
and In re Adoption of Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 88 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sur. Ct.
1949). For criticism of the New York program, see Comment, A Recon-
sideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 780
(1971); Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 848 (1952);
28 IND. L.J. 401 (1952); 65 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1952). In light of what had
been the more recent trend toward the consideration of religion as only one
of many factors in child care cases, the conclusions of the court in Dickens
seem appropriate and the criticism of the New York approach less justi-
fied.
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The Starr decision clouded the New York position concerning the
importance of religious factors in such cases, until Dickens held that
the matching provisions of the New York Constitution required only
that the religious preferences of the parents be considered in such
cases.
Defendants in Wilder urged the court to adopt the holding of
Dickens in order to sustain the New York program."i The court
declined, finding that it could not "compartmentalize one or two
laws, such as the religious-matching provision, and ignore their
close relationship to others, such as the public funding statutes."'9
Plaintiffs in Wilder raised the issue of state funding of religious
institutions-a question that was not before the court in Dickens.2 °
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the United States Supreme Court pro-
mulgated a set of guidelines for determining whether a given statute
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal [sic] or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entan-
glement with religion."22
18. 385 F. Supp. at 1022.
19. Id. (footnotes omitted). "When New York's religious-matching,
funding and foster care laws are considered together as one legislative
scheme, we cannot ignore the fact that they authorize the funding of foster
care by religious institutions dedicated to the propagation of their
respective faiths."Id.
20. Id. at 1023. The court stated: "Even if we accepted [Dickens]
interpretation of the state's religious-matching laws as permissive rather
than mandatory-a course which we are prepared to follow since the con-
struction emanates from the state's own highest court and presumably
governs those administering the laws-we doubt that Dickens 'controls'
this case, which deals with state-funded religious care." Id. (footnote omit-
ted).
21. 403 U.S. 602, 615-22 (1971). In this case, the Court declared uncon-
situtional statutes of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania which sought to
reimburse non-public schools for teacher costs related to non-religious
education. See also Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev. granted sub nom.
Blanton v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, 43
U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S., Mar. 24, 1975).
22. 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted). The tests expounded in
Lemon were derived, mainly, from the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Since Lemon, the above tripartite test has been, frequently
applied. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty,2 3 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a New York statute permitting the reimbursement of non-public
schools for expenses incurred in administering tests and preparing.
reports and records required by state law. The Court held that lump
sum payments to these schools violated the Lemon tests in that the
aid for secular purposes was not distinct and separable from that
usable for religious activities. 4
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,25 where it struck down a
New York law which provided for reimbursement of non-public
schools for maintenance of their facilities and equipment. The stat-
ute also permitted the reimbursement of low-income parents for the
tuition costs of sending their children to private schools. As in
Levitt, the Court held that the program failed to distinguish be-
tween religious and non-religious facilities" which served to advance
religion, 7 and created a potential entanglement between the state
and religion.2 8
The court in Wilder directly confronted the constitutional prob-
lem posed by lump sum payments to religiously affiliated institu-
tions. Citing Nyquist, it determined that where such government
funds may be used for religious purposes, laws authorizing the ex-
penditure of such funds are generally invalidY.2
religiously owned property); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(upholding a New York statute providing for a loan of textbooks to children
in parochial schools); and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(upholding a New Jersey statute allowing for the reimbursement of parents
for the transportation costs of children attending sectarian schools).
23. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
24. Id. at 481-82.
25. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
26. Id. at 774-80; accord, Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), which
struck down a similar program in Pennsylvania.
27. 413 U.S. at 788.
28. Id. at 794. See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
29. 385 F. Supp. at 1024. The court concluded: "Where there is a pros-
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It likewise recognized that the New York statutes, "insofar as they
govern foster care, do not have a solely secular purpose. One of the
principal objectives is to provide for the religious education of foster
children in accordance with the parents' wishes."30 Thus, a rigid
application of the Lemon tests would require a finding of unconsti-
tutionality. But the court determined that a rigid application of
Lemon would be inappropriate. Instead, it adopted a balancing
approach" designed to implement and protect "other equally im-
portant provisions of the Constitution . "...32
The Wilder court concluded that the right and obligation of par-
ents to direct the educational and spiritual upbringing of their chil-
dren must be given consideration.3 3 These parental rights have long
been recognized. Justice McReynolds, writing for the United States
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,34 stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
.... The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.w
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,3" the Supreme Court sustained a challenge
pect that governmental payments, direct or indirect, may be used for
sectarian purposes, laws authorizing such funding, even though enacted for
socially laudable purposes, have been invalidated as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause because their primary or principal effect is to advance
religion." Id.
30. Id. The court rejected defendants' statistical arguments which il-
lustrated that the amounts paid by the state were sufficient only to meet
a child's temporal needs: "The important point for present purposes is
that, regardless of how the state's statutes are labelled and whether or not
payments made under them exceed the actual cost of the child's secular
needs, the religious institutions or agencies are free under the statutes to
use the funds for advancement of the religions propagated by them." Id.
31. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
32. 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
33. Id. at 1025. The question propounded by the court was whether,
"since the religious-matching statutes were enacted in recognition of the
rights of parents and foster children freely to exercise their religious beliefs,
the public interest in free exercise of religion entitles them to be upheld
despite their involvement of the state in religion." Id.
34. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
35. Id. at 535.
36. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1975)
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by members of the Amish Menonite Church to a Wisconsin statute
requiring school attendance until age sixteen. The Court held that
such a law could not be applied as against the religious tenets of
the parents. 7 Citing Pierce, the Court noted that the rights and
obligations of parents toward their children extend to "the inculca-
tion of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citi-
zenship."38
The court in Wilder concluded that where the state has assumed
the responsibility of acting as a "surrogate parent" 9 it is obligated
to "enforce the biological parent's individual rights to provide reli-
gious direction . ".. 40 To deny this right would be tantamount to
government interference with religion." The court thus rejected a
literal reading of the establishment clause that would bar the state
from fully exercising its responsibilities as a substitute parent,42 and
concluded that the free exercise clause of the first amendment vali-
dated the New York practice.
This interpretation of the establishment clause appears to be a
natural extension of Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
37. Id. at 234.
38. Id. at 233. The rights of parents in relation to the free exercise
clause are also considered in Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923); United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.
1963). For illustrations of problems involving parent and child, see Roe v.
Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971); 46 ST. JOHNS
L. REv. 139 (1971). See also 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 599 (1974). The courts
have, however, restricted this doctrine to specific instances where the
health, safety, or morals of a child are jeopardized by the beliefs or activi-
ties of the parents. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); cf. People v. Pierson, 176
N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Clark, .Guidelines for the Free Excercise
Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1969); Note, State Intrusion Into Family
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1974).
39. 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The court realized the difficulty it faced and quoted Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the United States Supreme Court
recognized that "[n]o perfect or absolute separation [between religion
and government] is really possible . . . ." 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
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Abington School District v. Schempp.43
There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment
Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere with certain
religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment. Provisions for
churches and chaplains at military establishments for those in the armed
services may afford one such example. The like provision by state and federal
governments for chaplains in penal institutions may afford another example.
It is argued that such provisions may be assumed to contravene the Estab-
lishment Clause, yet be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to
secure to the members of the Armed Forces and prisoners . . . those rights
of worship guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause."
Once Wilder "concluded that an accommodation between the
Religious Clauses, when they are in conflict, is constitutionally per-
missible,"45 the remaining question" was "whether New York's reli-
gious placement laws are reasonable and necessary."4 7 In upholding
the New York laws, Wilder stated that the first amendment should
43. 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 296-97 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Justice
Stewart utilized the same reasoning. He concluded: "The short of the
matter is simply that the two relevant clauses of the First Amendment
cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very
nature may distort rather than illumine the problems involved in a partic-
ular case." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Another case supporting
this view is Horn v. California, 321 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd
mem., 436 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971),
where the district court held, inter alia, that the payment of government
funds to prison chaplains did not constitute an establishment of religion
in derogation of the first amendment. Accord, Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F.
Supp. 537, 543 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974);
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974); cf., Note, Religious Freedom in
Prison-Free Exercise vs. The Need for Prison Security, 36 ALBANY L.
REV. 416 (1972). For a broader view of the impact of the free exercise
clause upon the establishment clause, see Manning, The Douglas Concept
of God in Government, 39 WASH. L. REV. 47, 53-57, 65-69 (1964).
45. 385 F. Supp. at 1027.
46. See note 1 supra.
47. 385 F. Supp. at 1027. The court first pointed to the contributions
of religiously-affiliated child care centers. Id., see, D. SCHNEIDER & A.
DEUTSCH, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1867-1940,
at 5-9 (1941).
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be viewed in a "sensible and realistic fashion with a view to achiev-
ing whatever reconciliation is reasonably consistent with the pur-
pose and intention of the Founding Fathers."' 8
The Wilder plaintiffs argued that the rights of foster children and
the wishes of their parents might be satisfied without involving the
state in religion if the children were to receive religious instruction
outside of a state supported foster care facility." The court pointed
out the difficulty with such an approach in a community where
there is a wide diversity of religious creeds and practices. 0 Were the
state required to ascertain the religious needs of children in its care
and oversee their participation in religious practices, it would be
involving itself in religion to a far greater extent than presently.5'
Few issues are more likely to arouse public concern and political
controversy as the relationship of the state to religion.52 The estab-
48. 385 F. Supp. at 1026. See also Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899).
49. 385 F. Supp. at 1028.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1028-29. The court provided this illustration: "The parents
of a child brought up as a Congregationalist, for instance, might be satis-
fied with a 'weekly session' of sunday school followed by a short service
... . But a child raised as a Hassidic Jew would demand a far more
pervasive religious upbringing of the type associated with orthodox Juda-
ism. . . . It requires no imagination to appreciate that Quakers, Moslems,
Seventh Day Adventists and those of many other religious persuasions
would undoubtedly assert perfectly reasonable demands necessitating
wide variation in the handling by the state of children of these religions
... . In our view, the state, if it were required in each case to be responsi-
ble for such 'custom-tailoring' of each child's religious training, determin-
ing the extent of a child's participation in communal religious activities
of his persuasion and supervising the child's transportation to and custody
at such activities, would be hopelessly entangled in religion, far beyond its
existing simple relationship with foster parents and religious institutions,
under which the latter assume all of these responsibilities . . . ." Id.; cf.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The court further pointed out
the practical problem with such a proposal: "Although plaintiffs suggest
that non-sectarian homes, agencies or institutions be established, no clue
is furnished as to where any such existing facilities might be found or how
the capital funds for construction and staffing of new facilities might be
provided." 385 F. Supp. at 1028.
52. "The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the nor-
[Vol. III
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lishment and free exercise clauses appear to be effective agents in
securing the integrity of both the state and religion. As Wilder indi-
cates, however, there areifistances where the twin provisions of the
first amendment, rather than complimenting one another, seem to
conflict. 3 To make one absolute at the expense of the other is to
upset the delicate balance which the first amendment seeks to
achieve. 4
In Wilder, the court attempted to find a balance between the
funding aspect of the New York program and the right of parents
to direct the spiritual upbringing of their children. In doing so it
found sufficient "play in the joints productive of a benevolent neu-
trality"55 to accommodate the non-establishment mandate of the
first amendment with the no less important fact that "[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.""
In striking such a balance, it may be necessary, as Chief Justice
Burger has pointed out, to walk a "tight rope"57 between the two
clauses of the first amendment; it is a tight rope that the court in
Wilder has successfully traversed.
Richard F. Nacchio
mal political process." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
54. 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
55. Id. at 1019, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
56. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
57. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
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